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THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF UNDECLARED WORK IN 
CROATIA 
 
$OWKRXJKWKHUHLVQRRIILFLDOXQLYHUVDOGHILQLWLRQRIµXQGHFODUHGZRUN¶LWLVZLGHO\DFFHSWHG
across the European Union that WKLVFRYHUVµproductive activities that are lawful as regards 
their nature, but are not declared to the public authorities, taking into account the differences 
LQ WKHLU UHJXODWRU\ V\VWHPV EHWZHHQ 0HPEHU 6WDWHV¶ (European Commission, 2007: 2). 
Despite some 45 different adjectives and 10 nouns currently used to denote this activity (e.g., 
µLQIRUPDO¶µVKDGRZ¶µEODFN¶DQGµXQGHUJURXQG¶VHFWRUHFRQRP\ZRUN (Williams, 2004), we 
use the WHUPµundeclared economy¶ throughout this report. Indeed, the definition used aligns 
FORVHO\ZLWKWKHGHILQLWLRQRIWKHµVKDGRZHFRQRP\¶DGRSWHGE\6FKQHLGHUDQG(QVWH
79), which views it as including all legal production and provision of goods and services that 
are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following four reasons: (i) to avoid 
payment of income, value added or other taxes; (ii) to avoid payment of social security 
contributions; (iii) to avoid having to meet certain legal standards, such as minimum wages, 
maximum hours, safety standards, etc.; and (iv) to avoid compliance with certain 
administrative procedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires or other 
administrative forms. Although such a definition intimates that undeclared work might be a 
voluntary decision not to comply with legal obligations, to assume this would be to ignore 
how economic units and individuals may not be able to abide by the law, for instance, due to 
inappropriate legislation or lack of awareness. This has been taken on board in this report and 
its action plan. The ILO (2015: 6) Recommendation 204, moreover, provides a broader 
concept of informal economy of which undeclared work is part, which (a) refers to all 
economic activities by workers and economic units that are ± in law or in practice ± not 
covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements; and (b) does not cover illicit 
activities, in particular the provision of services or the production, sale, possession or use of 
goods forbidden by law, including the illicit production and trafficking of drugs, the illicit 
manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, trafficking in persons, and money laundering, as 
defined in the relevant international treaties. As such, the only difference between declared 
and undeclared work in this report is that it is not declared to the authorities for tax, social 
security and labour law purposes when it should be. If other differences exist, it is not 
undeclared work. For example, if the goods and services provided are illegal, it is part of the 
wider criminal economy, whilst if there is no monetary payment, it is part of the unpaid 
sphere (Franic and Williams, 2014; Williams et al., 2013).  
This definition is in line with the one adopted in Croatia and used in the official reports 
on this issue published by the authorities. As the Prohibition and Prevention of Unregistered 
Activities Act (Official Gazette, 2011) VWDWHVµXQUHJLVWHUHGDFWLYLW\¶LVDQ\W\SHRIOHJDOZRUN
conducted by individuals or firms without complete and valid documentation and required 
permissions. In terms of the subjects involved in these activities, the act clearly states that, 
apart from those who carry out undeclared activities, each individual and firm who purchases 
undeclared products and services, or in any way enables execution of these activities, is 
denoted as a participant. AFWLYLWLHVVXFKDVZRUNIRURQH¶VRZQQHHGVIDPLO\DVVLVWDQFHRU
help to friends and neighbours, are not considered as undeclared work, providing that the 
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work is carried out unpaid without financial or material benefit and is not done on a regular 
basis.  
 Given that undeclared work by definition is not declared to the authorities, it is 
therefore difficult to obtain reliable estimates of its magnitude and characteristics. Various 
methods have been used to estimate its size and characteristics. Evaluating the different 
measurement methods available, the European Commission (2007: 4) state:  
 
µ8QGHFODUHGZRUNFDQEHPHDVXUHGERWKGLUHFWO\DQGLQGLUHFWO\,QGLUHFWPHWKRGV are 
based on the comparison of macroeconomic aggregates (such as national accounts, 
electricity consumption, cash transactions). Indirect (especially monetary) methods 
often over-estimate the level of undeclared work and say little about its socio-
economic characteristics. Direct methods, on the contrary, are based on statistical 
surveys and have advantages in terms of comparability and detail, but tend to under-
UHSRUWWKHH[WHQWRIXQGHFODUHGZRUN¶ 
 
The resultant consensus has been to use indirect methods to measure the size of the 
undeclared economy and direct survey methods to identify its characteristics in terms of who 
engages in it, what they do and why, so as to inform policy development (Eurofound, 2013; 
Schneider and Williams, 2013; Williams and Schneider, 2016). This will be the approach 
adopted in this report.  
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1 Magnitude of the undeclared economy 
There are various estimates of the size of the undeclared economy in Croatia. Recognising 
this, it needs to be explicitly stated that the various figures reported here are not firm figures, 
but a range of estimates derived using various measurement methods commonly used by 
academics and policy-makers to develop approximations of the relative size of the undeclared 
economy and how its magnitude varies cross-nationally.     
 Figure 1 provides an estimate of the size of the Croatian undeclared economy relative 
to the EU-28 using the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) method, developed by 
Schneider (2013). This reveals that the undeclared economy in Croatia in 2016 was the 
equivalent of 27.1% of GDP, which puts Croatia as the country with the third largest 
undeclared economy in the EU28.  
 
Figure 1 Undeclared economy as % of GDP, 2016: by country 
 
Source: derived from Schneider (2016) 
Analysing whether the undeclared economy is growing or declining over time in both the 
EU-28 and Croatia using the MIMIC method, Table 1 reveals that besides a small increase in 
the size of the undeclared economy between 2008 and 2009, there has been a decline in the 
size of the undeclared economy in both the EU-28 and Croatia between both 2003 and 2008, 
as well as between 2009 and 2016. Indeed, according to this MIMIC method, Croatia is not 
alone in witnessing a small but steady decline in recent years. All member states have 
witnessed a decline (Schneider, 2016). 
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Table 1 Size of undeclared economy in EU-27 and Croatia, 2003-2016, % of 
official GDP 
Year EU-28 Croatia 
2003 22.6 32.3 
2004 22.3 32.3 
2005 21.8 31.5 
2006 21.1 31.2 
2007 20.3 30.4 
2008 19.6 29.6 
2009 20.1 30.1 
2010 19.9 29.8 
2011 19.6 29.5 
2012 19.3 29.0 
2013 18.8 28.4 
2014 18.6 28.0 
2015 18.3 27.7 
2016 17.9 27.1 
Source: Schneider (2016) 
 
The MIMIC method, however, is not the only measurement method. In order to analyse 
further how the size of the undeclared economy has changed over time in Croatia, Table 2 
reports the results of four different estimate methods. These estimates display not only the 
significant variations in the estimates of its size but that the direction of change differs 
according to the estimate method used. 
Table 2 Recent estimates of the changing size of the undeclared economy in 
Croatia 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
MIMIC* - - - 32.3 32.3 31.5 31.2 30.4 29.6 30.1 29.8 29.5 29.0 
MIMIC** 6.7 6.2 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.0 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.2 - - - 
Labour force 
method*** 
- - - - 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.1 1.7 3.8 4.2 - - 
Non-exhaustiveness 
of national 
accounts*** 
8.5 8.3 8.2 7.4 7.3 7.3 6.7 6.1 5.9 6.4 - - - 
Sources: * Schneider (2012), ** .ODULü, *** *DOLü1DJ\V]RPEDW\ 
 
According to Schneider (2012), after a steady decrease in the period 2003-2008, the share of 
the shadow economy in Croatia rose in 2009
1
. However, a slight decrease is noticeable during 
the subsequent period. $OWKRXJK DSSO\LQJ WKH VDPH PHWKRG .ODULü  XVHG D TXLWH
different definition, examining the share of the non-observed economy, which encompasses 
informal, illegal and underground production, as well as some other types of GDP under-
                                                 
1
  In this case, the definition and method used are the same as those in Schneider (2013) 
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coverage
2 +RZHYHU GHVSLWH DQDO\VLQJ D EURDGHU UDQJH RI DFWLYLWLHV .ODULü IRXQG WKDW WKH
share of WKHVH DFWLYLWLHV ZDV VLJQLILFDQWO\ ORZHU LQ FRPSDULVRQ ZLWK 6FKQHLGHU¶V HVWLPDWHV
Namely, it ranged between 6.7% in 2000 and 4.2% in 2009. Additionally, although his results 
DOVRLQGLFDWHDGHFUHDVLQJWUHQGXQWLO.ODULüIRXQGDFRQWLQXDWLRQRIWKLV trend even in 
2009.  
*DOLü1DJ\V]RPEDW\) HVWLPDWHVWKHVKDUHRIWKHµXQRIILFLDOHFRQRP\¶XVLQJWZR
different approaches, namely the labour force method and non-exhaustiveness of the national 
accounts. Here the unofficial economy connotes both legal and illegal production of goods 
and services that remain undetected and therefore not included in official GDP estimates. 
Although she finds a decreasing trend until 2008, her results for the period after the beginning 
of the crisis are quite different in comparison with those of Schneider and KlarLü,QOLQHZLWK
Schneider, she also found an increase in 2009, but estimates using the labour force method 
suggest an increase even in 2010. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that the labour force 
method assesses only the share of unregistered labour, while deliberate misreporting is not 
included.  
Despite these relatively inconclusive results about the changes in the size of the 
undeclared economy after the onset of the crisis, all studies confirm that there was a 
decreasing trend in the period preceding the crisis. Nonetheless, this decline does not 
necessarily imply the eradication of undeclared activities. Indeed, in their analysis of the non-
exhaustiveness of national accounts, /RYULQþHYLü0LNXOLüDQG*DOLü1DJ\V]RPEDW\ 
found that there was a constant increase in the absolute value of unofficially produced 
products and services during the period 2000-2008 (see Figure 2). Having in mind the high 
rates of GDP growth in the same period
3
, the drop in the relative size of undeclared work 
resulted from the faster growth of the declared economy, not the absolute decrease in 
undeclared work. 
 
Figure 2 Unofficial economy in Croatia, 2000-2008, in billion HRK 
Source: Based on /RYULQþHYLüHWDO 
                                                 
2
 For detailed explanation see OECD (2002) 
3
 The real growth rates of the official GPD in the given period ranged between 2.4% and 5.5% (Croatian 
National Bank, 2010) 
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Besides such indirect measurement methods, there are also direct survey methods. These tend 
to provide lower-bound estimates of its size due to the under-reporting of undeclared work by 
survey participants. The 2013 Eurobarometer survey reveals that 7.2% of surveyed 
respondents in Croatia reported engagement in undeclared activities during the 12 months 
prior to the survey. However, this is a lower-bound estimate not only because some might 
have provided a false answer but also because 2.9% of respondents refused to answer. A 
2015 direct survey of 2,000 respondents as part of the GREY project, meanwhile, finds that 
6.1% of surveyed respondents had engaged in undeclared work in the 12 months prior to the 
survey. These direct surveys, therefore, tentatively support the view of some of the indirect 
measurement methods above that there has been a decline in the size of the undeclared 
economy.  
In sum, whether one examines direct surveys of the size of the undeclared economy 
(5XELü:LOOLDPV Dor indirect measurement methods using proxy indicators to 
measure its prevalence (*DOLü 1DJ\V]RPEDW\, 2012, .ODULü  2WW  6FKQHLGHU
2013), the same finding is revealed. %HVLGHV6FKQHLGHU¶VHVWLPDWHVWhe undeclared economy 
is constantly found to be well under 10% of both total GDP and employment in Croatia, and 
it can be argued that the resources invested in tackling the undeclared economy are having a 
positive effect, since there is tentative evidence that it is declining in size over time.  
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2 Nature of the undeclared economy 
2.1 Varieties of undeclared work 
The undeclared economy includes both wholly undeclared work and under-declared work. 
Undeclared work refers to work entirely undeclared to the state for taxation, social insurance 
and/or labour law purposes. This includes unregistered employees without a contract who 
work for a business, for a household, as family members, private tutors, or as farm workers. 
They may be Croatian citizens, legal immigrants or immigrants with an irregular status. 
These workers might be secondary or multiple job holders who have social security coverage 
in their main job but do not contribute in their second job, or they may be pensioners, 
students, or others not in additional forms of declared employment. Besides undeclared 
waged employment, there is also undeclared own-account work conducted on a self-
employed basis where all or some of their transactions are not declared. Some of these self-
HPSOR\HG LQ &URDWLD PD\ EH µERJXV VHOI-HPSOR\HG¶ HQJDJHG LQ GLVJXLVHG HPSOR\PHQW IRU
one employer under a subordinate employment relationship rather than on a contract of 
services.   
 Under-declared work, meanwhile, refers to the illegal employer practice of salary 
under-reporting, including the practice of declared employers paying declared employees two 
salaries: (a) an official salary declared for tax, social security and labour law purposes, and 
E DQ DGGLWLRQDO XQGHFODUHG UHPXQHUDWLRQ UHFHLYHG µXQGHU WKH WDEOH¶ RU E\ µHQYHORSH¶
Another variant of under-declared work in Croatia is where larger businesses employ a 
person on say a 4 hour contract but they work for 7-8 hours. Detection of this form of under-
declared employment by the authorities is difficult. This is the focus of Activity 1.2. Here, 
therefore, the focus is upon entirely undeclared work.   
 One of the major problems when analysing the nature of undeclared work in Croatia 
is that there are very few sources of data. Indeed, one of the few data sources is inspections. 
In 2014, the Labour Inspectorate (LI), within the Ministry of Labour and Pension System, 
took over the responsibility for labour inspections from the State Inspectorate. Since 2012, 
however, there has been a continuous decline in the number of inspections (see Table 3). It 
should be noted that the 2016 data only covers the period until the end of September 2016, 
and are therefore not comparable with the inspection numbers reported for previous years. 
   
Table 3 The coverage of labour inspections in Croatia: in terms of business entities 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016q3 
The number of business entities 
(31.March) 
134 110 147 594 164 021 178 613 137 319 
The total number of inspections 15 665 14 143 11 861 9 242 5 880 
Inspections/BE ratio 11.68% 9.58% 7.23% 5.17% 4.28% 
Source: The Labour Inspectorate, Croatian Bureau of Statistics (Croatia in Figures 2016) 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, the number of business entities registered in Croatia grew between 
2012 and 2015, but the number of inspections decreased, resulting in an ever smaller 
proportion of businesses being inspected, decreasing from 11.68% in 2012 to 5.17% in 2015. 
Table 4 evaluates the proportion of all employees covered by labour inspections of 
businesses, based on the Labour Force Survey. This reveals that labour inspections covered 
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approximately 1.25% of all employees in employment in Croatia in 2015, with the average 
business entity inspected employing 2.15 employees.  
 
Table 4 The coverage of labour inspections in Croatia: in terms of employees 
 2015 
Employed persons based on the LFS 1 589 400 
The total number of employees in inspected organisational units 19 789 
Share of inspected employees on the total number of employees 1.25% 
Average number of employees in inspected organisational units of legal 
businesses 
2.15 
Source: The Labour Inspectorate, Croatian Bureau of Statistics (Croatia in Figures 2016) 
 
Examining the results of labour inspections, earlier data from the State Inspectorate (2013b) 
reveals that although violations in employment relations were present in almost all industries, 
they were most prevalent in the catering, construction and the trade sectors. Unregistered 
activities are also quite common in professions such as car mechanics, car body painters, hair 
stylists, massage therapists, tailors, florists, beauticians and various activities associated with 
the repair of household appliances. Those activities are usually carried out in private 
apartments and garages which makes it extremely difficult to detect them (State Inspectorate, 
2013a). When it comes to different types of undeclared work, the 2012 Annual report of the 
State Inspectorate reveals that the most common recorded violations were employment 
without a contract, and employment on a piece work agreement in situations where a standard 
work contract should be applied. This is followed by non-declaring to pension or health 
insurance authorities, employing foreign workers illegally or without informing the relevant 
authorities, and hiring seasonal workers for seasonal jobs in agriculture on an undeclared 
basis (State Inspectorate, 2013b).  
More recent evidence provided by the Labour Inspectorate shows that with the decline 
of the overall number of inspections, the absolute number of employees identified working 
without a contract has declined proportionally. However, the ratio of identified cases of 
violations to the overall number of inspections has remained relatively stable at around 10%. 
This suggests that a smaller proportion of the instances of the actual cases of working without 
a contract are being identified over time.      
Table 5 Revealed cases of employees with no working contracts 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016q3 
No working contract certificate 1 592 1 342 1 462 991 613 
The ratio of employees without a 
working contract on the number of 
inspections 
10.16% 9.49% 12.33% 10.72% 10.43% 
Source: The Labour Inspectorate 
 
Examining other forms of labour law violation, Table 6 reveals the number of identified cases 
where employees have been found to be not registered at the Croatian Pension Insurance 
Institute (CPII) and/or who have delayed registration at CPII. There has also been a slight 
increase in the ratio of identified cases relative to the number of inspections. Indeed, the 
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number of identified cases of working without registration at the Croatian Pension Insurance 
Institute is only slightly lower than the number of identified cases of employees working 
without a contract.   
 
Table 6 Revealed cases of employees with violations in the obligatory pension 
insurance  
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016q3 
Not registered at the Croatian Pension 
Insurance Institute (CPII) 
1 325 1 035 744 976 567 
Delayed registration at CPII 574 247 277 1 088 492 
The ratio of employees not registered at the 
CPII on the number of inspections 
8.46% 7.32% 6.27% 10.56% 9.64% 
Source: The Labour Inspectorate 
 
Table 7 reports the other cases of labour law violation identified by the Labour Inspectorate. 
The first important point to note is that the very few cases of foreign workers working 
contrary to the regulations have been identified. Such situations were revealed among only 
0.04% of employees in business units inspected in 2012, with this share dropping further in 
later years. The most common violation identified during inspections, however, is the 
violation of Article 93 paragraph 2 of the Labour Act. This paragraph defines that, in cases 
when the employer fails to pay remuneration, compensation or severance pay within their due 
dates, or fails to pay the worker the full amount, he or she is obliged to provide the worker 
with a payroll account for the amounts he or she was required to pay. Based on this, 
compensation can be claimed at the Court. Between 2012 and 2015, not only has there been a 
rapid increase in the number of identified cases of workers to whom the employer has not 
handed over a payroll slip (from 653 in 2012 to 1,115 in 2015) but also in the number of 
workers to whom the employer has not handed over the reimbursement slip or severance pay 
slip (from 3,448 in 2012 to 6,254 in 2015).   
 
Table 7 Other identified violations of the Labour Act   
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016q3 
The number of foreigners who worked 
contrary to regulations 
374 183 93 97 107 
 Share of the total number of supervisions 2.39% 1.29% 0.78% 1.05% 1.82% 
The number of workers to whom the 
employer has not handed over  payroll slip 
653 871 842 1 115 274 
 Share of the total number of supervisions 4.17% 6.16% 7.10% 12.06% 4.66% 
The number of workers to whom the 
employer has not handed over 
reimbursement slip or severance pay slip 
3 448 4 599 7 145 6 254 1 759 
 Share of the total number of supervisions 22.01% 32.52% 60.24% 67.67% 29.91% 
Source: The Labour Inspectorate 
 
Although such statistics produced by the Labour Inspectorate of the number of instances of 
different types of labour law violation identified during inspections are a useful insight into 
the character of undeclared work, the major problem is that these data are not based on a 
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representative or random sample of businesses. As such, it is erroneous to extrapolate from 
the data to the population.     
 The only known contemporary representative surveys of the character of undeclared 
work is special Eurobarometer No. 402 conducted in 2013, and a direct study conducted in 
2015 as part of the GREY Marie Curie research project on undeclared work in Croatia. 
Starting with the former, this interviewed 1,000 respondents face-to-face in the national 
language using a multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodology, which ensured that 
on the issues of gender, age, region and locality size, the sample was proportionate to, and 
representative of, the Croatian population.
4
  The GREY Marie Curie project, meanwhile, used 
the same sampling method but examined 2000 respondents in late 2015. Here, we report the 
results.  
 Analysing the types of undeclared work undertaken by participants in the 12 months 
prior to the survey in 2013 (2015 in parentheses): 
x 30% (33%) of all undeclared work was waged employment, of which: 
o 9%  (10%) was wholly undeclared waged employment, and 
o 21% (23%) was under-declared employment. 
x 12% (18%) was undeclared self-employment, and  
x 58% (49%) undeclared own-account work conducted for close social relations, such 
as kin, friends, acquaintances and neighbours.   
As such, one-third of all undeclared work is waged employment (with just under one quarter 
of all undeclared work involving the payment of envelope wages to formal employees), and 
the remaining two-thirds is undeclared self-employment (with one half of all undeclared work 
conducted on a self-employed basis for close social relations, and the remaining one-fifth 
involving undeclared self-employment for those other than close social relations).  
 Between 2013 and 2015, moreover, albeit based on a small sample, there appears to 
have been a decline in the proportion of undeclared work conducted on a self-employed basis 
for close social relations (from 58% to 49% of all undeclared work), and an expansion in the 
share conducted as undeclared self-employment for others (from 12% to 18%) and as waged 
employment (from 30% to 33%).   
 To further understand the sectors in which the undeclared economy is concentrated 
and who participates in such work, firstly, the demand for undeclared goods and services is 
analysed, and secondly, its supply from a household and business perspective.   
 
2.2 Demand for undeclared goods and services  
Overall, 17.4% of respondents in Croatia in 2013 stated they suspected that some of products 
and services they paid for had been produced in the undeclared economy. There are, 
however, some significant variations in the likelihood of different groups purchasing 
undeclared goods and services. As Table 8 reveals, it is noticeable that people with a higher 
level of education (more than 20 years of age when they finished their education) are by far 
                                                 
4
 To analyse the data, population weights are here applied to correct for over- and under-representation in the sample. For the 
descriptive statistics, the full sample has been used. For multivariate analysis, and to avoid excluding individuals who did not 
provide answers to every question, multiple imputations have been employed. Fifty imputations were simulated through a 
system of chained equations for every missing value. 
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the most likely to purchase undeclared goods and services. Furthermore, the self-employed, 
managers and other white collars are more likely to buy undeclared products and services.  
 
Table 8 Purchasers of undeclared goods and services in Croatia, 2015: % respondents 
  Yes No Refusal 
(SPONTANEOUS) 
Do not 
know 
          
Total 23.9 71.6 0.9 3.7 
Gender 
Male 24.7 70.7 0.7 3.9 
Female 23.3 72.2 0.9 3.6 
Age 
15 ± 24 20.3 73.4 1.2 5.0 
25 ± 34  28.3 67.3 1.0 3.5 
35 ± 54 27.1 68.0 0.9 4.0 
55 +  20.7 75.6 0.6 3.1 
Occupational status 
Employed 28.5 67.4 0.6 3.5 
Unemployed 23.8 71.3 0.6 4.3 
Self-employed  33.3 58.4 3.3 5.0 
Retired  18.6 77.9 0.6 2.9 
Student 17.9 75.9 0.9 5.4 
Other  23.9 67.3 3.1 6.1 
6RXUFH$XWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQWKH*5(<6XUYH\RQ+RXVHKROGV 
 
According to the 2013 Eurobarometer survey, there are significant regional differences in the 
propensity to purchase undeclared goods and services (see Table 9). For instance, people 
from Dalmatia, and Zagreb and the surrounding area, are far more likely to purchase 
undeclared goods and services. However, it should be mentioned that although Dalmatia 
scored low in the case of undeclared labour supply (5.7%), about one fifth of respondents 
(more than in any other region) stated they purchased goods and products on the undeclared 
market. The purchase of undeclared goods and services is also more common among larger 
urban populations than in rural areas. 
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Table 9 Spatial variations in the prevalence of undeclared work in Croatia, %  
  Engaged in undeclared 
work 
Purchase undeclared goods 
and services 
 2013 
Eurobarometer 
2015 
GREY 
2013 
Eurobarometer 
2015 
GREY 
Total 7.2 8.2 17.5 25.0 
      
Region     
Zagreb and surrounding 11.3 6.7 20.6 18.5 
North Croatia 1.7 7.6 15.6 21.6 
Slavonia 7.4 11.6 16.5 26.2 
Lika & Banovina 2.3 5.6 8.0 24.4 
Istra, Rijeka and Gorski Kotar 12.7 11.8 16.9 36.8 
Dalmatia 5.7 6.8 20.8 28.5 
Type of community     
Rural area or village 9.0 9.4 15.1 25.8 
Small/middle town 5.4 8.2 18.9 29.0 
Large town 6.7 6.6 20.1 18.4 
Source: Eurobarometer 402 (2013) and GREY Survey on Households (2015) 
 
What goods and services, therefore, do they purchase on an undeclared basis?   
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Figure 3 reveals that almost 30% of respondents who declared that they purchased some 
products and services without getting a receipt did so for home repairs and renovations
5
. This 
is followed by purchasing domestic food (for instance agricultural and farm products), with 
27% of respondents citing that these were the undeclared goods and services that they had 
purchased. On the other hand, we can realise that, apart from cleaning homes, people do not 
pay on an undeclared basis for other home-based activities, such as gardening, babysitting 
and ironing. As 5XELü argues, this is due to the strong family and neighbour networks: 
people rather prefer to help each other on an unpaid basis in these small-scale everyday 
activities rather than to spend money if not necessary. This perhaps reflects that in Croatia, 
there has not been the incursion of monetary exchange into the realm of mutual aid, as has 
been witnessed in other European regions (Onoshchenko and Williams, 2013; Vorley and 
Williams, 2012; Williams, 2004, 2009b, 2014).   
 
  
                                                 
5
 In this case, multiple answers were possible and therefore the sum of percentages exceeds 100. 
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Figure 3 Goods and products purchased in Croatia, % of respondents 
 6RXUFH$XWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQWKH*5(<6XUYH\RQ+RXVHKROGV 
 
Examining from whom they purchase undeclared goods and services, the finding is similar to 
the above finding regarding to whom undeclared work is supplied. It is largely close social 
relations from whom they purchase undeclared goods and services, primarily friends, 
colleagues and acquaintances, neighbours and kin (see Figure 4). These results therefore 
suggest that much undeclared work takes place within close social networks.  
 
Figure 4 Purchasers of undeclared good and services, % of respondents 
 
Source$XWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQWKH*5(<6XUYH\RQ+RXVHKROGV 
 
2.3 Supply of undeclared work 
Examining the 1,000 face-to-face interviews conducted in Croatia as part of the 2013 
Eurobarometer survey, 7.3% of citizens surveyed reported undertaking undeclared work in 
the prior 12 months (falling to 6.1% in the 2015 survey). Of these suppliers of undeclared 
work, 11% earned 1-100 euros from their undeclared work in the last 12 months, 10% 1010-
200 euros, 13% 201-500 euros, 8% 501-1000 euros, 19% over 1000 euros, and 40% either do 
not remember or know, or refused to answer. This reinforces how participants in direct 
surveys probably under-report their participation and result in lower-bound estimates of its 
prevalence. The usefulness of direct surveys, however, is that they enable understanding of 
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the character of undeclared work, including who engages and what they do, although the 
results reported here need to be treated tentatively due to the small numbers involved.  
 Table 10 reports the descriptive statistics on who is more likely to engage in 
undeclared work. This reveals that men are nearly three times more likely to engage in 
undeclared work than women, and how younger age groups, especially 25-39 years old, are 
more likely to do so than older age groups. Examining occupations, moreover, it is the 
unemployed and self-employed that are more likely to engage in undeclared work, along with 
manual workers. There is also a tendency for those who finished their education between 16-
19 years old to be more likely to engage in undeclared work than those who remained in 
education after this age.   
 
Table 10 People engaged in undeclared work in Croatia, 2015 % of respondents 
  Yes No Refusal  
(SPONTANEOUS) 
Do not 
know 
 
Total 8.1 89.9 1.5 0.6 
 
Gender 
Male 12.0 85.3 2.3 0.4 
Female 5.3 12.0 0.9 0.8 
Age 
15 - 24  13.3 85.1 0.8 0.8 
25 ± 34  9.5 87.3 2.5 0.6 
35 ± 54 10.2 87.7 1.7 0.5 
55+ 4.2 94.2 1.0 0.6 
Occupation 
Employed 7.3 89.8 2.1 0.8 
Unemployed 11.7 86.7 1.5 0.3 
Self-employed  15.4 82.7 1.7 0.0 
Retired  4.0 94.8 0.8 0.5 
Students  7.1 92.9 0.0 0.0 
Other  14.3 81.6 2.0 2.0 
6RXUFH$XWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQWKH*5(<6XUYH\RQ+RXVHKROGV 
 
Indeed, and as Figure 5 reveals, if we examine the employment status of those engaged in 
undeclared work, it is noticeable that manual workers, the unemployed and retired together 
account for about 70% of all undeclared workers in Croatia. Nearly one third of those 
engaged in undeclared work are manual workers. Similarly, almost every fourth undeclared 
worker is unemployed, while about every seventh undeclared worker is retired. 
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Figure 5 Undeclared workers in Croatia by occupation, in % 
6RXUFH$XWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQWKH6SHFLDO(XUREDURPHWHU 
 
What type of work, therefore, do these undeclared workers conduct? As  
Figure  illustrates, it seems that paid activities in the field of personal and household services 
comprise only a minor part of undeclared work in Croatia. On the other hand, work in the 
construction industry, especially home repairs and renovations, is by far the most common 
type of activity carried out on undeclared basis. For instance, almost one quarter of 
respondents engaged in undeclared activities stated they were working on repairs or 
renovations.   
 
Figure 6 Activities carried out on undeclared basis, in % of respondents  
 6RXUFH$XWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQWKH*5(<Survey on Households (2015) 
 
Examining the reasons for engaging in undeclared work,  
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Figure 1 reveals that almost half of respondents describe their undeclared practices as an 
outcome of a mutual agreement with purchasers due to the financial gain for both parties. In 
part, this argument can be seen as a direct result of these participants not understanding and 
appreciating the value of paying taxes to the wider society and the negative effects of 
working undeclared for the society overall. This is an important finding for policy, since it 
identifies the need for educational and awareness raising campaigns. However, there are two 
further sets of rationales. Some 28% of undeclared workers were motivated by the lack of 
formal employment opportunities and 24% by the lack of any alternative income which 
suggests that many are pushed into undeclared work as a necessity-driven survival practice. 
Another 19% recognise undeclared work as a common practice highly widespread in their 
country. Another set of reasons, however, are associated with more voluntary motives. Some 
16% justify their behaviour by their distrust in the state and its efficiency, some 12 % by high 
taxes and/or social security contributions and some 8% by the bureaucracy or red tape. 
   
Figure 1 Reasons for supplying undeclared work in Croatia, % of respondents   
 
Source: $XWKRUV¶FDOFXODWLRQVEDVHGRQWKH*5(<6XUYH\RQ+RXVHKROGV 
 
This tentatively suggests that the argument of Fields (1990, 2005) that participation in the 
undeclared economy is composed of a necessity-GULYHQµORZHUWLHU¶H[HPSOLILHGLQWKH
Eurobarometer survey by the greater likelihood of younger people, the unemployed and 
manual workers doing undeclared work, and a smaller more voluntary-RULHQWHGµXSSHUWLHU¶
exemplified by the tendency of 6.7% of managers to work undeclared, has a validity in 
Croatia. 
 To evaluate whether these descriptive trends are statistically significant when other 
variables are taken into account and held constant, Table 11 provides a probability model of 
participation in undeclared work.  The first important finding, which will be returned to later, 
is that there is no significant association between the perceived level of penalties and the 
likelihood of participation in undeclared work. Neither is there a significant correlation 
between the perceived risk of detection and participation in undeclared work. However, there 
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is a significant correlation between the likelihood of participation in undeclared work and a 
UHVSRQGHQW¶V YLHZV RQ WKH DFFHSWDELOLW\ RI HQJDJLQJ LQ XQGHFODUHG ZRUN LH WKHLU WD[
morale). Those with higher levels of tax morality
6
 are less likely to get involved in 
undeclared paid work. This relation remains statistically significant after including individual, 
socio-economic and regional controlling variables.  
Table 11 also reveals that men have a higher likelihood of being involved in 
undeclared work. This relation remains statistically significant also when controlling for other 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of individuals and region. The same applies 
for those cohabiting, living in a household with a partner without being married. 2QH¶V
personal acquaintance with someone in undeclared employment also significantly contributes 
to the likelihood of being involved in undeclared work. This suggests, therefore, that if one 
believes that others are engaged in undeclared work, you are more likely to do so oneself. Put 
another way, where there is lower horizontal trust (i.e., a perception that others are engaging 
in undeclared work), there is a greater likelihood that the respondent will engage in 
undeclared work. Undeclared work, therefore, is significantly correlated not only with 
vertical trust (i.e., a lack of belief and trust in the formal institutions) but also with horizontal 
trust (i.e., a lack of belief and trust that others in the population are acting legitimately).    
 
Table 11 Coefficients estimated by logit models on the probability of being involved in 
undeclared employment, dependent variable based on the question: Did you 
yourself carry out any undeclared paid activities in the last 12 months? 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Risk of being caught 0.209 0.24 0.402 0.402 0.382 
Severity of the penalty -0.023 -0.054 0.512 0.464 0.388 
Interaction: risk#penalty -0.081 -0.089 -0.243 -0.236 -0.221 
 
Tax morale index -0.053*** -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.032** 
Individual demographic characteristics 
Male - 0.793*** 0.848*** 0.889*** 0.949*** 
Age group (Age 55+ omitted)      
age <35 - 0.629* 0.393 0.402 0.343 
age 35-54 - 0.799** 0.638* 0.668* 0.688* 
Marital status (Married omitted)      
Cohabitating - 1.216*** 1.100** 1.060** 1.086** 
Single - 0.537 0.543 0.646* 0.689* 
Divorced - 0.163 0.092 0.187 0.182 
Widowed - 0.376 0.676 0.696 0.755 
Has kids - 0.219 0.148 0.162 -0.09 
Number of kids in the HH - 0.074 0.072 0.081 0.064 
 
                                                 
6
 Individuals with higher tax morality consider not-reporting of economic activities of firms and individuals as 
less acceptable.  
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Table continues on the next page  
 
Table continued from the previous page  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Socio-economic characteristics 
Personal acquaintance with 
someone involved in undeclared work 
- - 1.952*** 1.980*** 1.463*** 
Economic status (Retired omitted)      
Employed - - -0.795 -0.94 -0.936 
Self-employed - - -0.667 -0.88 -1.423 
Unemployed - - 1.007* 1.030* 0.827 
Student - - 0.023 0.104 -0.408 
Other - - 0.983 0.978 0.749 
Controlling for sector  - - Yes Yes Yes 
Income and financial situation indicators - - Yes Yes Yes 
Urban/rural characteristics 
Rural region - - - 0.414 0.593 
Small town - - - 0.149 0.048 
Region (Slavonia omitted)      
Zagreb i okolica - - - 0.585 0.868 
Sjeverna Hrvatska - - - 0.734 1.169* 
Lika i Banovina - - - 0.891* 1.296** 
Istra, Primorje i Gorski Kotar - - - 0.756 0.739 
Dalmacija - - - 0.093 0.296 
Buying of goods and services undeclared (non-buying undeclared omitted) 
Buying informal services - - - - -0.623 
Buying informal goods - - - - 0.739* 
Babysitting - - - - 1.871* 
HH services - - - - -1.328* 
Repairs - - - - 1.466*** 
Hair and beauty - - - - 1.379*** 
Tutoring - - - - 0.806* 
Car repairs - - - - 0.818* 
Food - - - - 0.159 
Other - - - - 0.152 
Constant -0.601 -2.215* -3.457* -4.449** -5.518** 
Model characteristics 
Number of observations 1712 1712 1712 1712 1645 
Pseudo R2 0.038 0.096 0.214 0.227 0.305 
Note: legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Source: The GREY survey (2015) 
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Although less strong, but still statistically significant, those who are unemployed are more 
likely to be involved in undeclared work. Slavonia appears to be the region with the lowest 
level of undeclared work. Lika i Banovina and partially also Sjeverna Hrvatska have a higher 
incidence of undeclared work. Buying goods produced undeclared in general increases the 
chance of being involved in supplying undeclared work.  
In sum, the risk of being caught and the severity of the penalty are not significantly 
associated with the likelihood of supplying undeclared work. The same applies when 
considering the interactions between risks of detection and the level of penalties. Intensifying 
deterrence measures does not change the supply of undeclared work. However, participation 
in undeclared work is significantly associated with attitudes towards its acceptability (i.e., tax 
morale), and also significantly associated with view on how widely others engage in such 
work. As such, policy measures focused on raising awareness about the negative impacts of 
undeclared work and benefits of declared work are important for reducing participation in the 
undeclared economy. So too is it important not to suggest that the rest of the population are 
widely engaged in such work. To put out such a message will encourage people to operate on 
an undeclared basis themselves.    
 
2.4 Participation in undeclared work: firm-level analysis 
The Eurobarometer Survey highlights undeclared work only from the perspective of 
undeclared workers and purchasers, and therefore does not give any information about these 
activities at the enterprise-level, such as business-to-business transactions. The World Bank 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), however, provide some 
insights on this issue. This harmonised survey across 135 countries scrutinises perceptions of 
firm representatives about a number of topics regarding the business environment, such as 
infrastructure, taxes, regulations, access to finance, competition, corruption and informality.  
12 summarises the findings about undeclared practices among enterprises in Croatia from the 
waves of the survey for the period 2007-2013. 
 
Table 12 Extent of undeclared work among enterprises 
 
Croatia 
2007 
Croatia 
2009 
Croatia 
2013 
% of firms formally registered when they started operations 
in the country 
98.1 99.6 96.3 
% of firms competing against unregistered or informal firms 31.7 47.7 48.2 
% of firms identifying practices of competitors in the informal 
sector as a major constraint 
25 18.1 18.8 
Source: World Bank, Business environment and enterprise performance survey (BEEPS) 
(2007, 2009, 2013) 
 
This reveals that 96.3% of currently formal firms in Croatia registered prior to starting 
operations. This proportion remains high during the whole period. However, even if most of 
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the formal firms surveyed were registered before starting operations, there is nevertheless 
evidence that the surveyed firms recognise the existence of informal competitors, such as 
unregistered enterprises or registered enterprises conducting a portion of their trade off-the-
books on an undeclared basis. Some one-third of enterprises in 2009, rising to just under a 
half of all enterprises in 2013, state that they are competing against unregistered enterprises 
or registered firms conducting a portion of their trade on an undeclared basis, and one-quarter 
of businesses in 2009 and 1 in 4 in 2013, identify the practices of these informal competitors 
as a major constraint in the running of their business.  
In order to gain further insight into the sector, business and spatial variations in 
undeclared practices among enterprises in Croatia, the findings of the World Bank BEEPS 
data can be analysed in more detail. Analysis by sector reveals that firms in the construction 
sector are the most likely to recognise competition from unregistered or informal firms ( 
13). Just under three-quarters of construction firms state that they are competing 
against informal or unregistered firms and just over one-third state that such informal or 
unregistered enterprises are a major constraint on their own business operations. Moreover, 
just under half of all manufacturing and service enterprises witness competition from 
informal competitors, although only around 1 in 7 assert that they represent a major 
constraint on their operations.  
 
Table 13 Prevalence of undeclared work in Croatia among enterprises: by sector, 
location, firm size, exporting status and ownership 
  % of firms competing 
against unregistered or 
informal firms 
% of firms identifying practices of 
competitors in informal sector as a 
major constraint 
All 48.2 18.8 
By sector:   
    Manufacturing 42.0 14.5 
    Construction 73.7 34.0 
    Services 41.2 15.0 
By location:   
    Northwest 47.2 19.8 
    Central and Eastern     
(Pannonian) 
57.3 21.3 
    Adriatic 44.4 15.9 
By firm size:   
  Small (5-19) 50.2 20.3 
  Medium (20-99) 45.7 16.6 
  Large (100+) 20.4 0 
By exporting status:   
  Direct exports 10%+ of 
sales 
31.1 16.4 
  Non-exporter 52.7 19.4 
Source: World Bank BEEPS (2013) 
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When it comes to spatial variations, it is noticeable that firms from the Central and Pannonian 
region are most likely to recognise the presence of informal competitors in their sector. 
Interestingly, firms from the Adriatic region to a lower extent recognise the presence of 
unregistered or informal competitors in their sector.  
Turning to firm size, it is more small businesses that recognise the presence of 
unregistered or informal competitors and also are more likely to see them as a major 
constraint. Larger firms, in contrast, are less affected by unregistered or informal competitors, 
as are those who are export-oriented less likely to be affected than non-exporter enterprises, 
doubtless as a result of the markets that are being served.  
However, it should be stressed that these results illustrate only the general opinion of 
surveyed managers of formal enterprises about undeclared practices. It is not an examination 
of actual practices. Therefore, it is difficult to give any relevant conclusion on this issue 
without a survey of undeclared practices among enterprises.  
Such a survey was carried out under the GREY Marie Curie research project. Here, a 
representative sample of 521 businesses in Croatia was surveyed, including micro-employers 
and the self-employed
7
, to detect the extent and nature of undeclared work practices. As 
Table 14 reveals, and based on an employers´ assessment of the occurrence of various 
informal practices in their competitors, we observe that undeclared employment (i.e., hiring a 
worker without a contract or hLULQJ DQ HPSOR\HH XQGHU ³KLGGHQ FODXVHV´ is perceived by 
businesses to be a common practice in their competitors. Some 1 in 20 businesses assert that 
FRPSHWLWRUEXVLQHVVHVDOZD\VKLUHZRUNHUVZLWKRXWFRQWUDFWRUXQGHUµKLGGHQFODXVHV¶ HJ
SD\LQJHQYHORSHZDJHV¶DQGDIXUWKHULQDVVHUWWKDWWKLVoccurs in most cases. Only 15% 
of employers assert that hiring a worker without a contract never occurs among their 
competitors and only 16% that hLULQJDQHPSOR\HHXQGHUFRQWUDFWEXWXQGHU³KLGGHQFODXVHV´
(i.e., with part of the wage paid as an envelope wage without a pay slip to avoid the 
obligatory social contribution payments).  
Besides such labour law violations, some 8% of businesses assert that their 
competitors report lower turnover, thus engaging in some transactions off-the-books, a 
further quarter of all businesses assert that this occurs in most cases and a further half that it 
occurs sometimes. There is also a perception that hiding/not paying taxes is widespread, as is 
the not issuing of receipts, and reporting lower profit, and VAT fraud. The illicit exporting or 
importing of goods is perceived as the least common among these informal practices. There 
is thus a widespread perception that undeclared practices are common among competitors. 
The outcome is a low level of horizontal trust that competitors are operating on a legitimate 
basis in terms of their business practices.  
 
  
                                                 
7
 The World Bank BEEPS sample only included formal firm employers with the minimum of 5 employees.  
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Table 14 Occurrence of informal activities of businesses in % 
 Always In most 
cases 
Sometimes Never 
Hiring a worker without contract 4 20 61 15 
Hiring an employee under "hidden 
clauses" 
5 22 57 16 
Reporting lower turnover 8 25 50 17 
Hiding/ not paying taxes 6 19 51 23 
Not issuing receipts 7 21 54 18 
Reporting lower profit 8 22 53 16 
Illicit exporting/importing goods 6 12 40 43 
VAT fraud 7 15 49 29 
Source: The GREY survey (2015) 
 
Assessing the proportion of businesses that view competitors as trading in the informal 
economy, employing workers without a contract, under-reporting the salaries of their 
employees and paying envelope wages, Figure 8 provides boxplots that display the 
distribution of responses. 50% of the observations are covered by the box, and the dots 
represent the upper 0.5% of the distribution.  Table 15, meanwhile, displays the mean and 
median figures. When assessing the percentage of trade conducted in the undeclared 
economy, the distribution of answers is wide. Although half of the responses have assessed 
the share of such trade activities to be below 20%, a relatively high proportion of values 
above 60% have pushed the mean up to 27.54% of total trade. As such, the average business 
in Croatia considers that over one quarter of total trade in their sector is conducted in the 
undeclared economy.  
As regards the two identified forms of undeclared employment (employing without a 
FRQWUDFW DQG ³HQYHORSH ZDJHV´ WKHVH are perceived to be as prevalent as trading in the 
undeclared economy ³(QYHORSH ZDJHV´, however, are perceived to be present relatively 
more often than employing workers without a contract. One half of the answers estimated 
that this practice of paying envelope wages is adopted in more than 30% of competitor 
companies in their sector. Wage payments received as envelope wages are perceived to 
comprise approximately 20% of the total wage payments.   
 
Table 15 Occurrence of undeclared trade and employing activities within sectors in % 
 
Mean Median 
No. of 
responses 
Percentage of trade in your sector conducted in the 
informal economy 
27.54 20 431 
The proportion of employees working without a contract 20.23 20 402 
Firms underreport actual salaries by approximately: 27.68 30 400 
Portion of the total wage payments paid unofficially as 
"envelope wages" 
24.30 20 368 
Source: The GREY survey (2015) 
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Figure 8 Occurrence of undeclared trade practices in sectors in % 
 
Source: The GREY survey (2015) 
 
In stark contrast to workers and purchasers, so far as businesses and employers are 
concerned, the perceived risk of detection and levels of penalties, and the risk versus penalty 
ratio, is an important factor in the assessment of the occurrence of undeclared work. Firms 
consider the risk of being caught when deciding whether to engage in undeclared practices. If 
this risk is too small, the severity of the penalty is not taken into account. If the risk of being 
caught grows over some threshold, then the severity of the potential penalty enters their 
calculations. Figure 9 and Table 16 report the results. The median assessment of the 
probability of being caught is 40% in the case of underreporting income and the number of 
employees. In the case of underreporting the amount it pays employees in salaries, the 
median assessment is lower, namely 30%, doubtless because it is recognised that the risk of 
detection is so much more difficult for labour and tax inspectors. We may assume, therefore, 
that the perception of a lower risk attached to such an undeclared practice is one reason for 
the LQFUHDVHGRFFXUUHQFHRI³HQYHORSHZDJe´payments among their competitors.  
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Table 16 If a company in your industry were caught for deliberately misreporting, 
what would be the typical consequence for the company? 
 N % 
Nothing serious 12 2.3 
A small fine 89 17.08 
A serious fine that would affect the competitiveness of the company 237 45.49 
A serious fine that would put the company at risk of insolvency 145 27.83 
The company would be forced to cease operations 38 7.29 
Total 521 100 
Source: The GREY survey (2015) 
Figure 9 Perception of the probability of being caught underreporting (in %) 
 
Source: The GREY survey (2015) 
 
Asking businesses about the undeclared practices of their competitors can be viewed as an 
indirect means of assessing their own involvement in undeclared practices of the respondents. 
Therefore, we consider this as our dependent variable to be able to explore the factors related 
to two types of undeclared work: employing workers without a contract (see Table 16) and 
the payment of envelope wages to employees (see Table 17). Identifying a dependent variable 
allows us to use some of the regression based model to explore the relation between the 
dependent variable and other factors (independent variables), covered by the GREY survey 
questionnaire. In our case we use an ordered logit regression based model and report five 
variants of the model including various sets of explanatory variables. 
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In seeking to explain the propensity to employ workers without a contract and paying 
workers envelope wages, we pay particular attention to the deterrence effect, namely  the 
perceived risk of being caught and the perceived severity of the potential penalty. Besides 
these two factors, we also report the coefficients for the ³XVXDOVXVSHFWV´ZKHQDQDO\VLQJWKH
drivers of undeclared work, namely firm characteristics such as the size of the company 
measured in terms of the number of employees, sectoral variables etc.; respondents´ 
assessment of the business environment, and respondents´ individual characteristics.  
Table 17 explores the factors significantly associated with employing workers without 
a contract when other factors are introduced and held constant. The finding is that the risk of 
being caught is significantly negatively associated with the view of whether competitors´ hire 
workers without a contract. This means that the higher the perceived risk of being caught, the 
lower is the probability of businesses asserting that competitors hire workers without a 
contract. This is a pattern observable across most comparable studies. In the case of the 2015 
GREY data, we observe this significant relationship, with a stable intensity, across all five 
models. In contrast, the severity of the penalty is not significantly associated with the 
probability of stating that competitors hire workers without a contract. The estimated 
coefficients were not statistically significant in any of the models. The strong intimation, 
therefore, is that it is more the perceived risk of detection, than the perceived severity of 
penalties, which will lead businesses not to hire workers without contract. Tax morality of 
employers also does not appear to be associated with stating that competitors hire workers 
without a contract.    
Turning to which firms are more likely to perceive competitors as hiring workers 
without a contract, the finding is that smaller firms are significantly more likely to do so. 
Analysing the sectors in which a business is more likely to view a competitor as hiring 
workers without a contract, the finding is that there are significant sectoral variations. The 
accommodation sector appears to be the sector with the highest occurrence of competitors´ 
hiring without a working contract. There is no statistically significant difference between 
accommodation and agriculture. In all other sectors, the view that competitors hire workers 
without a contract is significantly lower than in the accommodation sector. It is also the case 
that younger firms are significantly more likely to perceive competitors as hiring workers 
without a contract than older businesses. The significance of these differences disappears 
however, after we start to control for individual characteristics of the responding person 
(Model 5). Firms which are VAT payers are significantly more likely to report the occurrence 
of competitors´ hiring workers without a contract than non VAT payers.  
 
Table 17 Ordered logit results with the dependent variable: How often would you say 
hiring without a contract occurs within your direct competitor companies? 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Risk of being caught -0.009** -0.011** -0.009* -0.009* -0.010** 
Severity of the penalty 0.05 0.053 0.079 0.071 0.042 
Tax morale -0.016 -0.019 -0.009 -0.007 -0.018 
      
Firm characteristics 
Number of employees  -0.016** -0.012 -0.013* -0.014* 
Table continues on the next page 
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Table continued from the previous page Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Economic sector (Accommodation omitted)    
Agriculture  -0.825 -1.101 -1.271 -1.021 
Manufacturing  -1.747*** -2.305*** -2.286*** -1.612** 
Construction  -1.213* -1.916** -1.937** -1.091* 
Sales and transportation  -1.934*** -2.435*** -2.495*** -1.905*** 
Private services  -2.150*** -2.551*** -2.537*** -1.989*** 
Public services  -2.709*** -2.716*** -2.697*** -2.668*** 
Number of years in business (up to one year omitted)    
1-5 years  1.471* 2.654*** 2.681*** 1.317* 
Over 5 years  1.013 1.774* 1.768* 0.818 
      
VAT payer  -1.125** -1.095** -1.159** -1.021** 
Controlling variables for other firm 
characteristics 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Obstacle to doing business 
Legislative system   -0.205 -0.229  
Illegal competition   0.399** 0.392**  
Macroeconomic situation   -0.373** -0.400**  
Controlling for other variables related to 
the satisfaction with the business 
environment 
No No Yes Yes No 
Respondents´ individual characteristics 
Responding person was the owner    0.194 0.519* 
Controlling for individual characteristics 
of the respondent 
No No No Yes Yes 
      
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model statistics 
Number of observations 399 399 327 327 399 
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.071 0.161 0.175 0.086 
Note: legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Source: The GREY survey (2015) 
 
Employers were also asked to assess various obstacles to doing business. We have included 
these variables into our models (model 3 and 4), together with other variables referring to the 
assessment of the business environment, to explore their relationship with the likelihood of 
viewing competitors as hiring workers without a contract. Of these variables, only two are 
significantly correlated with the likelihood of perceiving competitors as hiring workers 
without a contract. Firms assessing illegal competition to be an obstacle are significantly 
more likely to view competitors as hiring workers without a contract, while firms assessing 
the business environment to be an obstacle reported a lower occurrence of competitors hiring 
workers without a contract.  
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 Table 18, meanwhile, evaluates the relationship between the likelihood of perceiving 
competitors as paying envelope wages to their employees and these same characteristics 
considered above. The results are similar. Again there is a statistically significant negative 
relationship between the perceived risk of being caught and envelope wages in all five 
models. The higher is the assessed risk of being caught, the lower the occurrence of envelope 
wages. There is no significant relationship, however, with the perceived severity of the 
penalty. Tax morale, again, is not associated with stating that competitors practice envelope 
waging. Firm size, however, is also not significant, although there are significant sectoral 
variations. The likelihood of competitors paying envelope wages is greatest in the 
accommodation sector, followed by construction and agriculture. Again, younger businesses 
1-5 years old are significantly more likely to identify envelope wages as a problem in 
competitor firms, although whether a firm pays VAT or not is not significantly related to the 
perceived likelihood of competitors paying envelope wages.  
 
Table 18 Ordered logit results with the dependent variable: How often would you say 
hiring an employee under a contract with "hidden clauses" occurs within your 
direct competitor companies? 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Risk of being caught -0.009* -0.010* -0.008 -0.008 -0.011** 
Severity of the penalty 0.123 0.106 0.083 0.111 0.104 
Tax morale -0.01 -0.011 0.008 0.011 -0.007 
      
Firm characteristics 
Number of employees  -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 
Economic sector (Accommodation omitted)    
Agriculture  -0.83 -1.194 -1.799 -1.228 
Manufacturing  -1.316** -1.758** -1.964** -1.298** 
Construction  -0.438 -0.981 -1.212 -0.463 
Sales and transportation  -1.068* -1.553** -1.787** -1.105* 
Private services  -1.356** -1.789** -2.037*** -1.346** 
Public services  -1.836** -1.934** -2.091** -1.919** 
Number of years in business (up to one year omitted)    
1-5 years  1.487* 1.896* 1.755* 1.373* 
Over 5 years  1.04 1.187 1.214 1.032 
      
VAT payer  -0.543 -0.586 -0.698 -0.522 
Controlling variables for other firm 
characteristics 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
Table continues on the next page 
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Table continued from the previous page Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Obstacle to doing business 
Legislative system   -0.461** -0.493**  
Illegal competition   0.092 0.067  
Macroeconomic situation   -0.081 -0.149  
Controlling for other variables related to 
the satisfaction with the business 
environment 
No No Yes Yes No 
Respondents´ individual characteristics 
Responding person was the owner    0.381 0.741** 
Controlling for individual characteristics 
of the respondent 
No No No Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model statistics 
Number of observations 357 357 312 312 357 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.046 0.098 0.12 0.068 
Note: legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Source: The GREY survey (2015) 
 
Of the variables related to the business environment, only the legislative system being an 
obstacle to doing business is significantly correlated with the occurrence of competitors´ 
paying envelope wages. Firms assessing the existing legislative system as an obstacle to 
doing business are more likely to report a lower occurrence of competitors´ paying envelope 
wages. If the responding person is the owner of the company, the relation to declaring the 
occurrence of competitors´ paying envelope wages is the same as to declaring competitors´ 
hiring without a working contract. This relation disappears, if we control for business 
environment assessment.  
Finally, an alternative dataset on the sectoral variations in the undeclared economy in 
Croatia is provided by /RYULQþHYLü HW DO  who evaluate the non-exhaustiveness of 
national accounts. They find significant sector variations during the period 2000-2008. For 
instance, while almost a half of the total unofficial economy in 2000 was located in 
manufacturing and the trade sector (see Error! Reference source not found.19), the 
proportion in these sectors declined over the period 2000 until 2009. On the other hand, 
relative importance of the undeclared economy in other sectors such as hotels and restaurants, 
or real estate, renting and business activities, almost doubled during the given period. The 
lesson, therefore, is that the undeclared economy is not a static sector. Indeed, one might 
VXSSRVHWKDWWKHDGYHQWRIZKDWLVYDULRXVFDOOHGWKHµVKDULQJ¶µSODWIRUP¶µFROODERUDWLYH¶RU
µJLJ¶ HFRQRP\ PD\ ZHOO KDYH VLJQLILFDQWO\ LQFreased the proportion of undeclared work 
which is conducted in sectors such as the accommodation sector in recent years, but which 
has not yet measured in statistical surveys.   
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Table 19 Structure of total non-exhaustiveness by activities, in %  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 7.73 6.55 6.74 6.19 5.94 5.02 5.17 5.18 5.07 
Fishing 0.03 0.46 0.56 0.54 0.58 0.52 0.47 0.44 0.45 
Mining and quarrying 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.02 
Manufacturing 22.53 19.58 21.45 17.02 15.28 16.27 15.04 14.87 15.23 
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.34 0.33 0.43 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.02 0.23 0.25 
Construction 9.36 11.42 9.87 12.22 14.91 13.02 12.34 11.45 11.67 
Wholesale and retail trade 20.74 23.43 18.88 20.87 18.72 19.70 20.14 19.22 18.52 
Hotels and restaurants 7.75 8.90 9.45 10.55 11.12 11.89 11.51 12.61 12.83 
Transport, storage and 
communication 
6.10 5.94 5.49 4.88 6.14 6.59 6.53 5.99 5.82 
Financial intermediation 1.58 0.08 1.72 1.72 0.58 0.93 0.86 0.82 0.82 
Real estate, renting and business 
activities 
7.89 8.93 10.24 11.01 12.27 11.40 12.77 13.36 13.11 
Public administration 0.23 0.21 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.12 
Education 0.77 0.23 0.61 0.32 0.03 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.27 
Health and social work 1.95 1.93 1.77 1.05 0.98 0.96 0.85 0.83 0.84 
Other community, social and 
personal service activities 
3.46 0.18 3.03 2.66 2.15 2.33 2.18 2.27 2.19 
 Illegal activities 9.13 9.33 9.39 10.27 10.43 10.47 11.28 12.16 12.59 
Note: the sum of individual column may slightly differ from 100 due to rounding 
Source: Calculation based on /RYULQþHYLüHWDO 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
This overview of the extent and nature of undeclared work has set the context for the analysis 
of what needs to be done to tackle the undeclared economy in Croatia. Akin to the declared 
economy and formal labour market, this report has revealed that the undeclared economy is a 
heterogeneous sphere composed of a wide array of different forms of work conducted as well 
as multifarious activities in a range of occupations and sectors, even if it is the case that some 
activities are more common than others, and it is more concentrated in some occupations and 
sectors more than others. It is also conducted by a diverse range of socio-demographic and 
socio-economic groups in the population, even if again it is more likely to be undertaken by 
some socio-demographic and socio-economic groups than others.   
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